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Abstract 1 
Moral judgments seem related to the emotion disgust. Evolutionary considerations might 2 
illuminate the psychological processes underlying this relation. Several studies have noted 3 
that individuals who are more disgust sensitive condemn moral violations more strongly. 4 
However, this association could result from both disgust sensitivity and moral judgment 5 
being correlated with political ideology. To clarify the relationship between disgust 6 
sensitivity and moral judgment, we analyzed data from multiple published and unpublished 7 
datasets that included the Three-Domain Disgust scale, the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 8 
and a measure of ideology (total N = 2,478). Results showed that associations between 9 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgment remained when controlling for ideology. Each of the 10 
three types of disgust sensitivity uniquely predicted at least one of the five moral foundations. 11 
Moral disgust predicted scores for all moral foundations (largest effect for 12 
Fairness/reciprocity). Sexual disgust predicted scores for all moral foundations except 13 
Fairness/reciprocity (largest effect for Purity/sanctity). Pathogen disgust had small predictive 14 
effects for Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. All effects were positive 15 
(i.e., higher levels of disgust sensitivity were associated with greater moral foundation 16 
endorsement). These findings suggest specific relations between disgust sensitivity and moral 17 
judgment that are not explained by ideology, shedding further light on the functions of 18 
disgust and morality. 19 
 20 
Keywords: disgust; three-domain disgust scale; moral judgment; moral foundations 21 
questionnaire; political ideology; conservatism22 
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1. Introduction 25 
Sentimentalist theories of moral psychology hold that moral judgments are influenced 26 
by emotions (Haidt, 2001). The emotion disgust seems particularly relevant for moral 27 
judgments (e.g., Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 28 
2013). For instance, many morally condemned behaviors involve food, treatment of bodily 29 
wastes, and sex—stimuli which can elicit disgust independent of moral condemnation. Some 30 
studies have reported that experimentally manipulating state disgust (e.g., via an odor) 31 
increases moral condemnation (e.g., Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Although a 32 
recent meta-analysis suggests that effects of state disgust on moral judgment may be weaker 33 
than previously assumed (Landy & Goodwin, 2015), another line of research indicates that 34 
individuals who are more prone to experiencing disgust also condemn moral violations more 35 
strongly (Chapman & Anderson, 2013). Further, because disgust sensitivity and moral 36 
judgment are multidimensional, exactly how dispositional variation in disgust sensitivity 37 
relates to moral condemnation remains unclear. 38 
 39 
1.1. How do moral judgments relate to disgust? 40 
Recent evolutionary psychological perspectives argue that moral judgments are the 41 
output of specific adaptations, which may be illuminated by the specific effects of disgust on 42 
moral judgment (Haidt & Graham, 2007; DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).  Recent research shows 43 
that disgust varies across pathogen, sexual, and moral domains (Tybur, Lieberman, & 44 
Griskevicius, 2009) and that moral judgment varies across five foundations (Graham et al., 45 
2011). One perspective suggests that one moral foundation—purity—evolved from pathogen-46 
avoidance mechanisms and that the key relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral 47 
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judgment should concern pathogen disgust and moral judgments related to purity (Haidt, 48 
2012); some data are consistent with this perspective (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 49 
2009). Other perspectives imply a less specific relationship between disgust and morality 50 
(Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Tybur et al., 2013); some data are consistent with this 51 
alternative perspective, with higher (pathogen) disgust sensitivity being related to moral 52 
judgments of harm and fairness violations (Chapman & Anderson, 2014) and with incidental 53 
disgust (from gustatory or olfactory inductions) amplifying moral condemnation outside of 54 
the purity domain (Landy & Goodwin, 2015). 55 
In addition, moral disgust might reflect a different process. Rather than an effect of 56 
emotions on moral judgment, moral disgust might reflect the use of emotional behaviors for 57 
navigating social interactions by communicating and coordinating moral condemnation 58 
(Tybur et al., 2013). From this perspective, individual differences in moral disgust sensitivity 59 
reflect motivations to avoid actions that might impose costs on oneself (e.g., being exploited) 60 
and tendencies to use disgust as a means of communicating one’s condemnation of such 61 
actions. 62 
In sum, the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral condemnation could 63 
vary across domains of both constructs, and the literature reports conflicting findings 64 
regarding which domains of disgust sensitivity relate to which moral foundations. Here, we 65 
seek to clarify how disgust sensitivity relates to moral judgment. Further, we test whether and 66 
how disgust sensitivity relates to moral judgment independent of a third variable that 67 
purportedly relates to disgust and moral judgment: political ideology.  68 
 69 
1.2. Both moral judgments and disgust sensitivity correlate with political ideology 70 
In some—but not all—societies the ideologies of many people can be described in 71 
terms of a dimension ranging from left-wing liberalism to right-wing conservatism (e.g., Jost, 72 
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Federico, & Napier, 2009). Liberals and conservatives vary on both moral foundation 73 
endorsement (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and disgust sensitivity (Inbar, Pizarro, & 74 
Bloom, 2009; Tybur, Merriman, Caldwell Hooper, McDonald, & Navarrete, 2010). 75 
Covariation between ideology and moral foundations could be argued to reflect 76 
conservatives’ higher investment in avoiding outgroups (e.g., Fincher & Thornhill, 2012) and 77 
consolidating ingroup cohesion (Haidt, 2012). Covariation between ideology and pathogen 78 
disgust sensitivity could be argued to reflect a similar behavioral strategy—that by avoiding 79 
outgroups and consolidating ingroup cohesion one lowers the likelihood of pathogenic 80 
infection (Tybur et al., 2010). Furthermore, covariation between ideology and sexual disgust 81 
sensitivity could be argued to reflect a sexual strategy. That is, ideology could reflect 82 
people’s endorsement of rules that benefit their own reproductive strategies (Tybur, Inbar, 83 
Güler, & Molho, 2015; Weeden & Kurzban, 2014). 84 
Hence, any correlations between disgust sensitivity and moral foundations could be a 85 
byproduct of a shared relationship with ideology. If disgust sensitivity and moral judgment 86 
are correlated because of their shared relationship with conservatism, then controlling for 87 
conservatism should reduce any associations between disgust sensitivity and moral judgment, 88 
which has implications for evolutionary models that draw direct links between disgust and 89 
morality. Thus, the current study tested whether and how disgust sensitivity relates to moral 90 
foundation endorsement, independent of ideology.  91 
 92 
2. Method 93 
We aggregated data from studies that included the Three-Domain Disgust Scale 94 
(TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009), the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 95 
2011), and a measure of ideology. The TDDS measures three types of disgust sensitivity—96 
moral, sexual, and pathogen—which reflect tendencies to be disgusted by moral violations, 97 
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sexual activities, and infectious substances, respectively. The MFQ measures five types of 98 
moral concerns: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and 99 
Purity/sanctity. Across samples, different versions of the MFQ were used. For all samples, 100 
scores for the MFQ subscales were the average item scores. Across the samples, ideology 101 
was measured with variables of different ranges, so scores for this variable were standardized 102 
for each sample before aggregation. As sex differences have been observed for both moral 103 
foundations (Graham et al., 2011) and disgust sensitivity (Tybur, Bryan, Lieberman, Caldwell 104 
Hooper, & Merriman, 2011), we controlled for participant sex in all analyses.  105 
We compiled three new datasets and five already published datasets:  106 
 One sample was from an unpublished study by Van Leeuwen and Park (2013). The 107 
sample consisted of 273 students (158 females, 115 males; age M = 20.5 years, SD = 108 
3.97) from a UK university who completed multiple questionnaires as part of 109 
experimental sessions that also included unrelated tasks. The majority (n = 224) were 110 
British; the others were from China (n = 12) and a variety of other countries. Participants 111 
completed the TDDS, MFQ-30, and indicated their political orientation on a 7-point 112 
scale (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative).  113 
 Two samples were from an unpublished Master thesis (Dukes, 2011). One sample 114 
consisted of 47 individuals residing in the USA (32 females, 15 males; age M = 35.9 115 
years, SD = 11.97); another sample consisted of 83 individuals residing in India (31 116 
females, 52 males; age M = 29.4, SD = 8.46). Both samples were recruited via Amazon 117 
Mechanical Turk. Participants completed the TDDS, MFQ-20, and, as a measure of 118 
ideology, the 16-item SDO scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The SDO 119 
items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) and showed 120 
high reliability in both samples (USA α = .93, India α = .90). In both samples the study 121 
materials were in English. 122 
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 Two samples were from Kurzban, Dukes, and Weeden (2010). One sample consisted of 123 
students at a US university (N = 521); another consisted of US residents recruited via 124 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 479). Participants completed the TDDS and the MFQ-43 125 
(scores were transformed to range from 0 to 5), and they indicated their political 126 
orientation on a 7-point scale (1 = very liberal, 7 = very conservative).  127 
 Three samples were from Quintelier, Ishii, Weeden, Kurzban, and Braeckman (2013), 128 
which included students from Belgium (N = 493), the Netherlands (N = 285), and Japan 129 
(N = 297). Participants completed the TDDS, the MFQ-30, and ideology measures that 130 
differed across countries. In the Japanese sample, ideology was measured with a 7-point 131 
scale (1 = strongly support left wing, 7 = strongly support right wing). In the Belgian and 132 
Dutch samples, ideology was measured with a 4-point scale reflecting political party 133 
preference. The scale was coded so that lower values indicate progressivism and higher 134 
values indicate conservatism. In the Belgian and Dutch samples the materials were in 135 
Dutch; in the Japanese sample the materials were in Japanese. 136 
 137 
3. Results 138 
Reliabilities for the disgust sensitivity scales were high in all samples (αs ranging 139 
from .74 to .93, see Supplemental Materials S1). Reliabilities for the moral foundations 140 
subscales differed across samples, ranging from low (α = .42) to high (α = .88; Median α = 141 
.67; see Supplemental Materials S1). 142 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Graham et al., 2009) conservatism correlated 143 
negatively with the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations and positively with the 144 
Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity foundations (see Table 1). Consistent 145 
with Tybur et al. (2010), conservatism showed a small positive correlation with sexual 146 
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disgust sensitivity, but showed almost no correlation with moral and pathogen disgust 147 
sensitivity. 148 
 149 
Table 1: Correlations between all included variables. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Moral disgust -         
2. Sexual disgust .40* -        
3. Pathogen disgust .32* .45* -       
4. Harm .29* .23* .20* -      
5. Fairness .20* .05 .12* .54* -     
6. Ingroup .10* .14* .19* .25* .39* -    
7. Authority .17* .19* .24* .25* .34* .65* -   
8. Purity .29* .44* .31* .37* .29* .52* .60* -  
9. Conservatism .04 .13* .02 -.10* -.12* .15* .21* .19* - 
10. Female .11* .42* .19* .20* .08* -.04 -.00 .10* -.04 
Note. Cases with missing data were excluded pairwise. Ns ranged from 2278 to 2389. * p < .01. 
 150 
Participants were nested within samples, and failing to account for this nesting could 151 
yield spurious correlations (Kievit, Frankenhuis, Waldorp, & Borsboom, 2013). For example, 152 
four samples may on average have low disgust sensitivity and low moral judgment, and four 153 
samples may on average have high disgust sensitivity and high moral judgment. To account 154 
for the nested data structure, we analyzed the data using maximum-likelihood hierarchical 155 
linear regression. Moral foundation scores were regressed on sex, conservatism, moral 156 
disgust sensitivity, sexual disgust sensitivity, and pathogen disgust sensitivity (all level 1), 157 
and cases were nested within samples (level 2). Moral, sexual, and pathogen disgust 158 
sensitivity were centered within samples. Intercepts were allowed to vary across samples, as 159 
were slopes for conservatism (allowing slopes for sex and the disgust sensitivity variables to 160 
vary across samples yielded models that either did not converge or demonstrated no 161 
significant variability in slopes). We also computed models that did not include conservatism 162 
as a predictor. We computed standardized coefficients as β = (unstandardized coefficient × 163 
SDpredictor) / SDoutcome (Hox, 2010).  164 
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On the whole, the three domains of disgust sensitivity were positively related to the 165 
five moral foundations (see Table 2). Controlling for conservatism had little effect on the 166 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral foundations. The largest change was for 167 
the effect of sexual disgust sensitivity on Authority/respect, where β was reduced from 0.15 168 
to 0.10. 169 
Results indicated that the TDDS moral domain was uniquely related to all five MFQ 170 
domains, with the strongest relationships with Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity (βs = 0.19 171 
and 0.23) and smaller relationships with Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and 172 
Purity/sanctity (βs ranged from 0.08 to 0.11). The TDDS sexual domain was related to four of 173 
the MFQ domains, with the strongest relationship with Purity/sanctity (β = 0.32), smaller 174 
relationships with Harm/care, Ingroup/loyalty, and Authority/respect (βs ranged from 0.06 to 175 
0.11), and no relationship with Fairness/reciprocity (β = 0.01). Finally, the TDDS pathogen 176 
domain was uniquely related to three of the MFQ domains, with weak relationships with 177 
Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity (βs ranged from 0.07 to 0.13), and no 178 
relationship with Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity (βs = 0.03 and 0.04). 179 
 180 
Table 2: Standardized regression coefficients (with 95% confidence intervals) for predicting moral 
foundation scores from TDDS moral, sexual, and pathogen factors, participant sex, and political 
conservatism. For each TDDS domain, the left column shows the coefficients when not controlling for 
political conservatism. Participants (level 1) were nested within samples (level 2). 
Moral 
Foundation 
Moral disgust 
β 
[95% CI] 
Sexual disgust 
β 
[95% CI] 
Pathogen disgust 
β 
[95% CI] 
 Politics 
Excluded 
Politics 
included 
Politics 
excluded 
Politics 
included 
Politics 
excluded 
Politics 
included 
Harm 
 
 
0.21*** 
[0.17, 0.25] 
0.19*** 
[0.15, 0.24] 
0.05 
[-0.00, 0.09] 
0.06* 
[0.01, 0.11] 
0.04 
[-0.00, 0.08] 
0.03 
[-0.01, 0.07] 
Fairness 
 
 
0.25*** 
[0.21, 0.29] 
0.23*** 
[0.19, 0.27] 
-0.01 
[-0.05, 0.04] 
0.01 
[-0.03, 0.06] 
0.04* 
[0.00, 0.08] 
0.04 
[-0.00, 0.08] 
Ingroup 
 
 
0.08*** 
[0.04, 0.12] 
0.08*** 
[0.04, 0.12] 
0.14*** 
[0.09, 0.18] 
0.11*** 
[0.06, 0.16] 
0.09*** 
[0.05, 0.14] 
0.09*** 
[0.05, 0.13] 
Authority 
 
 
0.11*** 
[0.07, 0.15] 
0.10*** 
[0.06, 0.14] 
0.15*** 
[0.10, 0.20] 
0.10*** 
[0.06, 0.15] 
0.13*** 
[0.08, 0.17] 
0.13*** 
[0.09, 0.18] 
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Purity 
 
0.11*** 
[0.08, 0.15] 
0.11*** 
[0.07, 0.15] 
0.36*** 
[0.31, 0.40] 
0.32*** 
[0.28, 0.36] 
0.06*** 
[0.03, 0.10] 
0.07*** 
[0.03, 0.11]  
Note. Cases with missing data were excluded listwise. For models that did not include conservatism, Ns 
= 2273; 2285; 2270; 2274; 2279, respectively. For models that included conservatism, Ns = 2187; 2197; 
2186; 2188; 2191, respectively. Standardized coefficients for the fixed effect of conservatism were -0.16 
[-0.31, -0.01], -0.22 [-0.44, -0.01], 0.10 [-0.11, 0.31], 0.16 [0.03, 0.30], and 0.11 [-0.05, 0.28], 
respectively. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 181 
 To verify whether this analysis—which aggregated across different measures of 182 
conservatism administered in different political contexts—had not yielded results that 183 
diverged from those in the samples when analyzed separately, we regressed each of the moral 184 
foundations on the three disgust sensitivities, conservatism, and sex for each of the samples 185 
separately. These regression analyses showed that the effects of conservatism differed across 186 
samples (see Supplemental Materials S2). Nevertheless, for each kind of disgust sensitivity, 187 
the strongest predictive effects were usually observed in multiple samples (see Supplemental 188 
Materials S3).  189 
 190 
4. Discussion 191 
Results showed that moral judgments for each foundation were uniquely related to at 192 
least one domain of disgust sensitivity, even when controlling for ideology and sex. All 193 
effects were positive (i.e., higher levels of disgust sensitivity were associated greater moral 194 
foundation endorsement). Many of the effects were small, perhaps due in part to the 195 
inadequate reliabilities of the moral foundations scores. As the regression coefficients 196 
indicate unique effects, these effects cannot be attributed to (1) general acquiescence on 197 
either of the questionnaires, or (2) the disgust sensitivity scores reflecting a general tendency 198 
to evaluate social events negatively. That disgust sensitivity and moral judgment remained 199 
associated when controlling for ideology suggests that—at least across these samples—200 
ideology did not confound correlations between disgust sensitivity and moral judgment.  201 
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Across the samples, ideology was assessed with different measures, which might have 202 
yielded differences in measurement accuracy (e.g., liberal vs. conservative in the USA 203 
samples might have captured ideology better than did left-wing vs. right-wing in the Japanese 204 
sample). Therefore, the analyses might have controlled for ideology better in some samples 205 
than in others. In addition, the contents of ideology are different across cultures. However, 206 
even for the samples in which ideology was presumably measured appropriately (e.g., the 207 
USA and UK samples), we observed multiple positive associations between disgust 208 
sensitivity and the moral foundations (see Supplemental Material S3). Nevertheless, further 209 
research may explore whether associations between disgust sensitivity and the moral 210 
foundations are robust to controlling for culturally appropriate multi-dimensional measures of 211 
ideology. Further research might also verify that the same pattern of associations is observed 212 
when using another measure of moral judgments. Such research might show whether the 213 
small effect sizes observed here genuine or are an artifact of the MFQ.  214 
A related issue is whether the associations between disgust sensitivity and the moral 215 
foundations are similar across countries. The current findings suggest that the effects 216 
observed for moral disgust sensitivity and sexual disgust sensitivity are not limited to USA 217 
and UK populations (as these predictors showed similar effects in the Belgian and Dutch 218 
samples). However, the results suggest that the effects observed for pathogen disgust 219 
sensitivity might be limited to USA and UK populations. Further research could explore 220 
whether the strongest effect observed for pathogen disgust sensitivity (its association with 221 
Authority) is observed across cultures. 222 
The finding that multiple types of disgust sensitivity predicted multiple moral 223 
foundations is consistent with disgust being elicited by moral condemnation and with disgust 224 
amplifying and/or producing moral condemnation (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Rozin et al., 225 
2008; Tybur et al., 2013). Consistent with the notion that condemnation is sometimes 226 
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expressed with disgust, individuals more prone to expressing disgust vis-à-vis moral 227 
violations were also more likely to moralize across all foundations. The current findings thus 228 
support the notion that disgust sometimes is an output of moral judgments. Furthermore, 229 
consistent with the notion that people sometimes condemn disgusting actions, individuals 230 
more easily disgusted by situations involving pathogens or sex were also more likely to 231 
moralize Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Thus, although our results 232 
do not inform about the specific issue of whether disgust produces or merely increases moral 233 
condemnation, the current findings do support the broader notion that sexual and pathogen 234 
disgust sometimes serves as input to moral decisions.   235 
That sexual disgust predicted Purity/sanctity is unsurprising as some items assessing 236 
the latter explicitly mention disgust or sexual acts. However, that sexual disgust predicted 237 
Purity/sanctity more strongly than did pathogen disgust suggests an inconsistency between 238 
theory and research on the moral foundations. The observed pattern suggests that either the 239 
Purity/sanctity foundation is more based on concerns about sexual reproduction than on 240 
concerns about infectious disease (cf. Haidt & Graham, 2007; Tybur et al., 2015), or the 241 
subscale assessing endorsement of the Purity/sanctity foundation does not accurately capture 242 
the intended construct. 243 
In summary, we observed unique associations between individual differences in 244 
disgust sensitivity and moral judgment. Further research may examine whether these 245 
associations are confounded by a currently unknown variable. It is possible that these 246 
predictive effects of trait disgust are genuine and do not translate to corresponding 247 
experimental effects of state disgust (cf. Landy & Goodwin, 2015). For functional traits 248 
requiring prolonged learning or development, momentary experimental manipulations cannot 249 
always be expected to exert analogous effects on the outcomes. 250 
251 
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Disgust Sensitivity Relates to Moral Foundations Independent of Political Ideology 
Supplemental Materials S1 
Table S1.1: Cronbach’s αs for the disgust sensitivity and moral foundations subscales across 
the eight samples. 
 Sample 
 USA-1 USA-2 UK USA-3 IN BE NL JP 
Moral Disgust .86 .88 .78 .93 .89 .80 .79 .81 
Sexual Disgust .84 .86 .86 .88 .89 .79 .83 .86 
Pathogen Disgust .80 .83 .76 .86 .85 .81 .80 .74 
Harm .73 .71 .53 .49 .68 .53 .46 .67 
Fairness .68 .67 .58 .66 .76 .54 .56 .54 
Ingroup .67 .71 .64 .72 .64 .54 .54 .62 
Authority .78 .78 .59 .73 .51 .65 .67 .54 
Purity .83 .88 .70 .82 .53 .68 .68 .42 
Note. Sample coding: USA-1 = USA undergraduate sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); USA-
2 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); UK = UK student sample from 
Van Leeuwen and Park (2013); USA-3 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from Dukes (2011); 
IN = India Mechanical Turk sample from Dukes (2011); BE = Belgian sample from Quintelier 
et al. (2013); NL = Dutch sample from Quintelier et al. (2013); JP = Japan sample from 
Quintelier et al. (2013). 
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Table S2.1: Standardized regression coefficients of conservatism across samples. Effects 
were estimated in OLS regression models that included predictors for all three disgust 
sensitivities, conservatism, and sex. Significant effects (p < .05) are marked with an *. 
Outcome USA-1 USA-2 UK USA-3 IN BE NL JP 
Harm -.06 -.11* -.22* -.24 -.45* -.03 -.01 -.18* 
Fairness -.09 -.05 -.32* -.25 -.65* -.10 -.15* -.14* 
Ingroup .03 .21* .34* .43* -.41* -.05 .11 .10 
Authority .15* .28* .33* .37* -.25* .18* .16* .12* 
Purity .07 .25* .28* .35* -.42* .03 .26* -.02 
Note. Sample coding: USA-1 = USA undergraduate sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); 
USA-2 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); UK = UK student 
sample from Van Leeuwen and Park (2013); USA-3 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from 
Dukes (2011); IN = India Mechanical Turk sample from Dukes (2011); BE = Belgian sample 
from Quintelier et al. (2013); NL = Dutch sample from Quintelier et al. (2013); JP = Japan 
sample from Quintelier et al. (2013). 
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The strongest predictive effects of disgust sensitivity reported in Table 2 were usually 
observed in multiple samples. In particular, moral disgust sensitivity was a significant 
positive predictor of Harm and Fairness in six of the eight samples (Table S3.1). Sexual 
disgust sensitivity was a significant positive predictor of Ingroup and Authority in four 
samples and a significant positive predictor of Purity in five samples (Table S3.2). For 
pathogen disgust sensitivity associations were more variable across the samples (Table S3.3). 
Pathogen disgust sensitivity was a significant positive predictor of Authority in five samples, 
but significant predictive effects for Ingroup and Purity were observed in only 3 samples 
(only in samples from the USA or UK).  
 
Table S3.1: Standardized regression coefficients of moral disgust sensitivity across samples. 
Effects were estimated in models that included predictors for all three disgust sensitivities, 
conservatism, and sex. Significant effects (p < .05) are marked with an *. 
Outcome USA-1 USA-2 UK USA-3 IN BE NL JP 
Harm 0.20* 0.15* 0.31* 0.20 0.33* 0.18* 0.13 0.32* 
Fairness 0.24* 0.29* 0.20* 0.18 0.19 0.26* 0.24* 0.24* 
Ingroup 0.06 -0.004 0.24* 0.24 0.25 0.11* 0.07 0.08 
Authority 0.08 0.13* 0.16* 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.15* -0.04 
Purity 0.10* 0.10* 0.15* 0.22 0.32 0.17* -0.02 0.21* 
 
Table S3.2: Standardized regression coefficients of sexual disgust sensitivity across samples. 
Effects were estimated in models that included predictors for all three disgust sensitivities, 
conservatism, and sex. Significant effects (p < .05) are marked with an *. 
Outcome USA-1 USA-2 UK USA-3 IN BE NL JP 
Harm 0.13* 0.10* -0.10 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.18* -0.13 
Fairness 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.16 -0.11 0.05 0.05 -0.17* 
Ingroup 0.19* 0.13* 0.04 -0.12 -0.09 0.28* 0.22* -0.02 
Authority 0.18* 0.06 0.17* 0.03 0.07 0.19* 0.23* -0.03 
Purity 0.34* 0.37* 0.47* 0.03 -0.12 0.43* 0.55* 0.11 
 
Table S3.3: Standardized regression coefficients of pathogen disgust sensitivity across 
samples. Effects were estimated in models that included predictors for all three disgust 
sensitivities, conservatism, and sex. Significant effects (p < .05) are marked with an *. 
Outcome USA-1 USA-2 UK USA-3 IN BE NL JP 
Harm 0.14* 0.04 0.09 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 -0.17* -0.08 
Fairness 0.13* 0.04 0.06 0.23 0.08 -0.09 -0.10 0.05 
Ingroup 0.10* 0.18* 0.16* 0.15 -0.09 0.01 0.04 0.09 
Authority 0.15* 0.16* 0.05 0.41* 0.002 0.14* 0.04 0.20* 
Purity 0.15* 0.09* -0.02 0.45* -0.14 0.07 -0.07 0.03 
 
Note. Sample coding: USA-1 = USA undergraduate sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); 
USA-2 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from Kurzban et al. (2009); UK = UK student 
sample from Van Leeuwen and Park (2013); USA-3 = USA Mechanical Turk sample from 
Dukes (2011); IN = India Mechanical Turk sample from Dukes (2011); BE = Belgian sample 
from Quintelier et al. (2013); NL = Dutch sample from Quintelier et al. (2013); JP = Japan 
sample from Quintelier et al. (2013). 
